Shiksha Nation
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Bayes correlated equilibrium

Solution concept in Game Theory

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Intuitively, a Bayes correlated equilibrium allows for players to correlate their actions in such a way that no player has an incentive to deviate for every possible type they may have. It was first proposed by Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris.

Formal definition

Preliminaries

Let I be a set of players, and Θ a set of possible states of the world. A game is defined as a tuple G=⟨(Ai,ui)i∈I,Θ,ψ⟩, where Ai is the set of possible actions (with A=∏i∈IAi) and ui:A×Θ→R is the utility function for each player, and ψ∈Δ++(Θ) is a full support common prior over the states of the world.

An information structure is defined as a tuple S=⟨(Ti)i∈I,π⟩, where Ti is a set of possible signals (or types) each player can receive (with T=∏i∈ITi), and π:Θ→Δ(T) is a signal distribution function, informing the probability π(t|θ) of observing the joint signal t∈T when the state of the world is θ∈Θ.

By joining those two definitions, one can define Γ=(G,S) as an incomplete information game. A decision rule for the incomplete information game Γ=(G,S) is a mapping σ:T×Θ→Δ(A). Intuitively, the value of decision rule σ(a|t,θ) can be thought of as a joint recommendation for players to play the joint mixed strategy σ(⋅∣t,θ)∈Δ(A) when the joint signal received is t∈T and the state of the world is θ∈Θ.

Definition

A Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) is defined to be a decision rule σ which is obedient: that is, one where no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the recommended joint strategy, for any possible type they may be. Formally, decision rule σ is obedient (and a Bayes correlated equilibrium) for game Γ=(G,S) if, for every player i∈I, every signal ti∈Ti and every action ai∈Ai, we have

∑a−i,t−i,θψ(θ)π(ti,t−i|θ)σ(ai,a−i|ti,t−i,θ)ui(ai,a−i,θ)


≥∑a−i,t−i,θψ(θ)π(ti,t−i|θ)σ(ai,a−i|ti,t−i,θ)ui(ai′,a−i,θ)

for all ai′∈Ai.

That is, every player obtains a higher expected payoff by following the recommendation from the decision rule than by deviating to any other possible action.

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